|
iDEA: Drexel E-repository and Archives >
Drexel Academic Community >
Bennett S. LeBow College of Business >
Department of Economics & International Business >
Faculty Research and Publications (Economics & International Business) >
Probabilistic equilibria for evolutionarily stable strategies
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/1860/1834
|
| Title: | Probabilistic equilibria for evolutionarily stable strategies |
| Authors: | McCain, Roger A. |
| Issue Date: | Feb-2007 |
| Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
| Citation: | Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(1): pp. 34-36. |
| Abstract: | This comment suggest that an equilibrium framework may be retained, in an evolutionary model such as Gintis’ and with far more realistic results, if rationality is relaxed in a slightly different way than he proposes: decisions are assumed to be related to rewards probabilistically, rather than with certainty. This relaxed concept of rationality gives rise to probabilistic equilibria. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/1860/1834 |
| Appears in Collections: | Faculty Research and Publications (Economics & International Business)
|
Items in iDEA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|
www.drexel.edu
